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∗	  The	  author	   is	   the	  spokesman	  of	  an	   interdisciplinary	  research	  group	  concerning	  the	  application	  of	  the	  
(German)	   rules	   on	   corporate	   liability	   as	   well	   as	   a	   national	   Research	   correspondent	   of	   the	   European	  
Commission	  on	  Anti-­‐Corruption	  policies.	  The	  views	  and	  opinions	  expressed	  in	  this	  paper	  are	  those	  of	  the	  
author	  and	  do	  not	  necessarily	  reflect	  the	  position	  of	  the	  research	  group,	  the	  OECD,	  WGB	  or	  any	  other	  
institution.	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1.	  General	  remarks	  
	  
a)	  The	  OECD	  Working	  Group	  on	  Bribery	  (WGB)	  has	  launched	  a	  public	  consultation	  to	  
inform	   its	   thinking	  on	   liability	  of	   legal	  persons	   for	   foreign	  bribery.	  The	  consultation	  
document	  invites	  the	  public	  to	  share	  insights	  and	  experiences	  concerning	  the	  impact,	  
advantages	  and	  disadvantages	  of	  particular	  features	  of	  LP	  liability	  regimes.1	  	  
	  
b)	  According	  to	  Art.	  3	  OECD	  Convention,	  bribery	  of	  a	   foreign	  public	  official	   shall	  be	  
punishable	   by	   `effective,	   proportionate	   and	   dissuasive	   criminal	   penalties.´	   In	   the	  
event	  that,	  under	  the	  legal	  system	  of	  a	  Party,	  criminal	  responsibility	  is	  not	  applicable	  
to	   legal	  persons,	  that	  Party	  shall	  ensure	  that	   legal	  persons	  are	  subject	  to	  ´effective,	  
proportionate	  and	  dissuasive	  non-­‐criminal	  sanctions´.	  	  
	  
Effective,	  proportionate	  and	  dissuasive	  (criminal	  or	  non-­‐criminal)	  sanctions	  can	  only	  
be	  imposed,	  if	  the	  following	  requirements	  are	  fulfilled:	  
• Statutes	   (within	   the	  substantive	   law,	  e.g.	   criminal	   code)	   that	  allow	   for	   sanc-­‐
tioning	  legal	  persons	  and	  confiscating	  the	  proceeds	  of	  crime,	  if	  	  
o (at	  least)	  a	  top-­‐level	  manager	  of	  the	  legal	  person	  neglects	  his/her	  du-­‐
ties	   to	   supervise	   the	   employees	   with	   the	   effect	   that	   an	   employee	  
bribes	  a	  foreign	  public	  official,	  or	  
o (at	   least)	  a	  mid	  or	  top-­‐level	  manager	  of	  the	  legal	  person	  him-­‐	  or	  her-­‐
self	  bribes	  a	  foreign	  public	  official	  in	  the	  course	  of	  business	  relations.	  	  
• Statutes	  or	  other	  rules,	  which	  specify	  the	  conditions,	  according	  to	  which	  law	  
enforcement	  bodies	  are	  obliged	  to	  investigate	  against	  a	  legal	  person,	  as	  well	  
as	  the	  conditions,	  according	  to	  which	  they	  may	  abstain	  from	  investigating	  or	  
terminate	  them.	  
• Sufficiently	   staffed	   and	   specialized	   law	   enforcement	   bodies	   and	   (criminal)	  
courts	  which	  are	  trained	  to	  conduct	  investigations	  against	  large,	  often	  multi-­‐
national	  enterprises.	  
                                            
1	  The	  compilation	  of	   results	  of	   the	  consultation	  process	   is	  published	  on	   the	  webside	  oft	  he	  WGB,	   see	  
http://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-­‐bribery/Public-­‐Consultation-­‐Liability-­‐Legal-­‐Persons-­‐Responses.pdf.	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• A	  positive	  attitude	  within	  the	  law	  enforcement	  bodies	  towards	  laws	  allowing	  
for	   sanctioning	   legal	  persons.	  This	   isn’t	   trivial,	   as	  many	  German	  prosecution	  
offices	   simply	   do	   not	   apply	   the	   existing	   law,	   due	   to	   a	   diffuse	   opposition	  
against	   the	   law	   and/or	   a	   lacking	   tradition	   of	   investigating	   against	   legal	   per-­‐
sons.	  
• Comprehensive	  statutes	  (within	  the	  procedural	  law)	  that	  allow	  for	  conducting	  
(criminal)	   investigations	  against	   legal	  persons,	   including	  conducting	   the	  nec-­‐
essary	  investigation	  measure,	  e.g.	  search	  and	  seizure	  (including	  electronic	  da-­‐
ta	  on	  servers	  or	  within	  an	  electronic	  cloud),	  wire-­‐tapping.	  
• Statutes,	  which	  allow	   for	   flexible	   sanctions	   relating	   to	   the	   size	  of	   the	  enter-­‐
prise	  respectively	  its	  turnover	  (and	  not	  the	  legal	  person,	  as	  the	  latter	  can	  be	  
smaller	  than	  the	  enterprise).	  
• Statutes,	  which	  allow	  for	  sanctioning	  the	  legal	  successor	  of	  a	  fined	  legal	  per-­‐
son.	  
	  
2.	  Nature	  of	  liability	  
	  
a)	  Currently,	  the	  German	  law	  does	  not	  provide	  for	  a	  criminal	  liability	  of	  legal	  persons.	  
Rather,	  according	  to	  the	  German	  Administrative	  Offence	  Act	  a	  legal	  person	  (or	  an	  as-­‐
sociation	  with	  legal	  capacity)	  can	  be	  fined	  for	  criminal	  offences	  or	  administrative	  of-­‐
fences	  committed	  by	  certain	  types	  of	  managers	  and	  employees.	  The	  fine	  is	  an	  admin-­‐
istrative	  fine,	  not	  a	  criminal	  sanction.	  It	  is	  a	  non-­‐obligatory	  legal	  consequence,	  which	  
can	  be	  imposed	  by	  prosecutors	  or	  representatives	  of	  other	  state	  institutions	  (such	  as	  
regulatory	  authorities).	  When	  the	  legal	  person	  refuses	  to	  pay	  the	  fine,	  a	  circuit	  judge	  
of	  a	  local	  court	  has	  to	  decide;	  typically,	  these	  judges	  have	  neither	  specialization	  nor	  
training	  in	  proceedings	  against	  (multinational)	  legal	  persons.	  The	  fine	  cannot	  exceed	  
a	   threshold	  of	  10	  million	  euro,	  but	  can	  be	  summed	  up	  with	   the	  confiscation	  of	   the	  
proceeds	  of	  the	  crime	  or	  administrative	  offence.	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b)	  In	  comparison	  to	  that,	  a	  criminal	  liability	  has	  several	  advantages:	  
	  
• A	  stronger	   symbolic	  notion	   than	  an	  administrative	   fine.	  Administrative	   fines	  
are,	  in	  Germany	  at	  least,	  related	  to	  breaches	  of	  lower	  grade	  duties,	  whereas	  a	  
criminal	  sanction	  reveals	  that	  the	  perpetrator	  has	  violated	  a	  norm	  of	  greater	  
importance.	  
• In	  Germany,	  prosecutors	  are	  obliged	  to	   investigate	  given	  sufficient	  suspicion	  
of	  a	  criminal	  offence.	  In	  contrast,	  they	  have	  a	  margin	  of	  discretion	  whether	  to	  
start	  investigations	  or	  not,	  when	  a	  breach	  of	  duty	  can	  only	  be	  sanctioned	  by	  
an	  administrative	   fine.	   Legal	   persons	   are	   currently	   subject	   to	   administrative	  
fines	   in	  Germany.	  Hence,	   prosecutors	   are	  not	  obliged	   to	   investigate	   against	  
legal	  persons.	  According	  to	  a	  representative	  survey	  my	  research	  group	  is	  cur-­‐
rently	   conducting,2	   German	   prosecution	   offices	   used	   to	   apply	   the	   law	   inco-­‐
herently:	  19	  out	  of	  48	  prosecution	  offices	  did	  not	  have	  a	  single	  case	  of	  inves-­‐
tigations	  against	  a	  legal	  person	  from	  2011	  till	  today.	  Germany	  seems	  to	  be	  di-­‐
vided:	   whereas	   the	   prosecution	   offices	   in	   Bavaria	   and	   Baden-­‐Württemberg	  
seem	   to	   apply	   the	   law,	   three	   of	   the	   federal	   states	   (Bundesländer)	   only	   had	  
one	  case	  each,	  one	  federal	  state	  even	  did	  not	  have	  a	  single	  case.	  
• Criminal	  trials	   in	  Germany	  are	  public,	  whilst	  administrative	  sanctions	  are	  be-­‐
ing	  imposed	  following	  non-­‐public	  proceedings.	  For	  this	  reason	  alone,	  criminal	  
proceedings	  are	  far	  more	  deterrent	  than	  administrative	  proceedings.	  
• Criminal	  sanctions	  in	  Germany,	  fines	  in	  particular,	  are	  flexible	  in	  scale	  as	  they	  
must	  reflect	  the	  gravity	  of	  the	  crime	  and	  relate	  to	  the	  guilt	  of	  the	  perpetrator.	  
In	  contrast	  to	  that,	  a	  legal	  person	  can	  only	  be	  subject	  to	  an	  administrative	  fine	  
of	  up	   to	  10	  million	  euros,	   irrespective	  of	   the	  severity	  of	   the	  breach	  of	  duty,	  
the	  consequences	  of	  the	  criminal	  act	  and	  the	  financial	  potential	  of	  the	  enter-­‐
prise,	  in	  which	  the	  crime	  occurred.3	  
• Criminal	  sanctions	  can	  be	  imposed	  for	  actions	  inside	  and	  outside	  the	  Federal	  
Republic	  of	  Germany.	  The	  principle	  of	  territoriality	  is	  sided	  by	  the	  principles	  of	  
                                            
2	  The	  final	  results	  will	  be	  published	  in	  2017.	  
3	  There	  are	  different	  rules	  for	  fining	  in	  cartel/competition	  law.	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nationality	   and	   subsidiary	   protection	   of	   foreign	   states.	   In	   contrast	   to	   that,	  
administrative	   fines	   can	  only	  be	   imposed	   for	   (corporate)	   actions	   committed	  
on	  the	  territory	  of	  Germany.	  
• In	  criminal	  cases,	  cross-­‐border	  legal	  assistance	  is	  much	  easier,	  since	  most	  laws	  
and	  treaties	  focus	  on	  investigations	  in	  criminal	  cases.	  
	  
3.	  Legal	  basis	  of	  liability	  
	  
a)	  The	  legal	  basis	  of	  liability	  matters.	  The	  decision	  between	  an	  implementation	  inside	  
or	  outside	  the	  criminal	   law	  has	  several	   legal	  consequences	  (supra	  2.	  b).	  Against	  this	  
background,	  the	  legislator	  in	  my	  view	  only	  has	  two	  options:	  providing	  for	  new	  rules	  
of	  liability	  of	  legal	  persons	  either	  within	  the	  German	  Criminal	  Code	  (Strafgesetzbuch)	  
or	  in	  a	  separate	  code.	  As	  the	  Criminal	  Code	  includes	  the	  most	  severe	  crimes,	  the	  first	  
option	  would	  certainly	  send	  a	  strong	  signal	  to	  both	  law	  enforcement	  bodies	  and	  rep-­‐
resentatives	  of	   legal	  persons.	  The	  second	  option	  would	  have	  a	  slightly	  minor	  “sym-­‐
bolic	  impact”,	  but	  allows	  for	  a	  better	  implementation	  of	  rules	  on	  questions	  that	  only	  
occur	  when	   it	   comes	   to	   sanctioning	   legal	  persons.	  Moreover,	   it	  would	  help	  draw	  a	  
distinction	  between	  corporate	  criminal	  liability	  and	  individual	  criminal	  liability	  and	  its	  
conceptual	  framework	  (e.g.	  guilt).	  
	  
In	  my	  view,	  the	  German	  legislator	  should	  not	  enact	  a	  law	  specifically	  addressing	  cor-­‐
porate	  liability	  for	  foreign	  bribery,	  but	  should	  rather	  put	  a	  general	  law	  in	  place.	  There	  
is	  no	  reason	  for	  differentiating	  between	   legal	  consequences	  for	   foreign	  bribery	  and	  
legal	  consequences	  for	  other	  crimes.	  Rather,	  a	  bribery-­‐specific	  legislation	  could	  have	  
a	  negative	  effect	  since	  in	  Germany	  as	  a	  “country	  of	  codification”	  prosecutors,	  judges	  
and	  other	  practitioners	  focus	  on	  those	  crimes	  covered	  by	  the	  general	  codes,	   in	  par-­‐
ticular	  the	  Criminal	  Code.	  For	  that	  reason,	  a	  bribery-­‐specific	  legislation	  would	  certain-­‐
ly	  attract	  less	  attention	  and	  could	  even	  be	  regarded	  as	  a	  law	  of	  a	  minor	  importance.	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b)	  The	  OECD	  Anti-­‐Corruption	  Convention	  only	  had	  a	  minor	  influence	  on	  the	  German	  
discussion,	  since	  the	  national	  lawmaker	  is	  of	  the	  opinion	  that	  the	  current	  system	  (su-­‐
pra	  2	  a)	  complies	  with	  all	  obligations	  of	  international	  and	  European	  treaties.	  The	  fact	  
that	  politics	  and	  scholars	  are	  currently	  debating,	  whether	  Germany	  should	  sharpen	  
its	   law	  and	  even	  introduce	  corporate	  criminal	   liability,	   is	  caused	  by	  the	  financial	  cri-­‐
ses,	  several	  scandals	   in	  the	  bank	  and	  automotive	  industry	  as	  well	  as	  by	  a	  change	  of	  
opinion	  among	  German	  criminal	  law	  scholars,	  who	  used	  to	  be	  very	  critical	  of	  corpo-­‐
rate	  criminal	  liability.	  
	  
4.	  Types	  of	  entities	  covered	  
	  
Usually	   entities	   lacking	   legal	   personality	   are,	   economically	   spoken,	   	   of	   minor	   im-­‐
portance	  and	  therefore	  do	  not	  usually	  cause	  serious	  transnational	  corruption	  prob-­‐
lems.	  However,	  exceptions	  do	  exist.	  For	  example	  a	  famous	  German	  drugstore-­‐chain	  
lacked	  legal	  personality	  under	  the	  formal	  lead	  of	  a	  sole	  proprietor.	  Since	  the	  German	  
law	  only	  allows	   fining	   legal	  persons	  and	  associations	  who	  have	   legal	   capacity,	   such	  
enterprises	  could	  not	  be	  sanctioned,	   if	  a	   representative	  of	  such	  an	  enterprise	  were	  
responsible	  for	  a	  corruption	  offence.	  Thus,	  sanctioning	  entities	  lacking	  legal	  personal-­‐
ity	  would	  close	  such	  loopholes.	  	  
	  
Apart	  from	  that,	  covering	  such	  entities	  would	  have	  additional	  preventive	  effects	  as,	  
for	  example,	  the	  scale	  of	  a	  fine	  could	  relate	  to	  the	  turnover	  of	  an	  (economic)	  entity	  
and	  not	  to	  the	  turnover	  of	  a	  concrete	  legal	  person	  forming	  part	  of	  a	  multi-­‐corporate	  
enterprise.	  	  
	  
From	  a	  conceptual	  point	  of	  view,	  the	  question,	  whether	  an	  entity	   lacking	   legal	  per-­‐
sonality	   shall	  be	   sanctioned	  or	  not,	  does	  not	   imply	  particular	  problems:	  as	   soon	  as	  
the	  legislator	  opts	  for	  sanctioning	  such	  entities,	  they	  become	  legal	  persons,	  at	   least	  
within	  the	  framework	  of	  criminal	  law.	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5.	  Standard	  of	  liability	  –	  whose	  acts?	  
	  
In	  general,	  the	  “failure	  to	  supervise”	  model	  for	  holding	  legal	  persons	  liable	  is	  a	  rather	  
unattractive	  for	   law	  enforcement	  bodies,	  since	  they	  must	  prove	  the	   insufficiency	  of	  
the	  supervision	  or	  compliance	  management	  system	  or	  an	  individual	  fault.	  Such	  proof	  
can	   be	   difficult	   and	   sometimes	   impossible.	   Therefore,	   in	   my	   experience,	   law	   en-­‐
forcement	  bodies	   seek	   to	  prove	   that	   a	  mid-­‐level	   employee	  has	   committed	  a	   crime	  
(for	  example:	  bribery;	  inciting	  bribery,	  assisting	  bribery).	  	  
	  
If	  to	  low-­‐level	  persons	  are	  concerned,	  this	  strict	  liability	  model	  causes	  a	  conceptual,	  
even	   constitutional	   problem:	  why	   should	   a	   legal	   person	   be	   held	   liable	   for	   a	   crime	  
committed	  by	  a	  natural	  person,	  who	  has	  no	  bearing	  on	  the	  management	  and	  even	  
cannot	   legally	   represent	   the	   entity?	   Some	   argue,	   that	   a	   corporate	   liability	   in	   such	  
cases	  can	  only	  be	  justified,	  if	  a	  mid	  or	  a	  top-­‐level	  person	  has	  violated	  his/her	  duties	  
to	  supervise	  his/her	  subordinates.	  	  
	  
In	  cases	  of	   foreign	  bribery	   it	   is	  often	  difficult	   to	  prove	  who	  has	  actually	  committed	  
the	  active	  bribery.	  In	  these	  cases	  it	  would	  be	  helpful,	  if	  the	  national	  law	  allowed	  the	  
sanctioning	  of	  the	  legal	  entity	  for	  a	  failure	  of	  supervision,	  which	  has	  led	  to	  a	  crime	  of	  
an	  unknown	  employee.	  
	  
6.	  Standards	  of	  liability	  
	  
a)	  The	  choice	  of	  the	  said	  conditions	  clearly	  influences	  the	  scope	  of	  corporate	  liability	  
and	  the	   factual	  ability	   to	  prosecute	   foreign	  bribery.	  For	  example,	   the	   term	  “for	   the	  
benefit”	   is	  narrower	  than	  the	  phrase	  “in	  the	  interest	  of”:	  The	  first	  term	  relates	  to	  a	  
proper	   benefit,	   in	   some	   cases	   –	   like	   Germany	   –	   even	   a	   financial	   benefit	   (“enrich-­‐
ment”),	  whereas	  the	  latter	  encompasses	  all	  sorts	  of	  interests.	  Moreover,	   it	  makes	  a	  
difference,	   whether	   the	   national	   law	   requires	   proving	   that	   the	   entity	   actually	   has	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profited	  or	  whether	  it	  is	  sufficient	  that	  the	  employee	  acted	  with	  the	  intent	  to	  bribe	  in	  
favor	  of	  his/her	  employer.	  
	  
Phrases	  that	  speak	  of	  “on	  behalf”	  or	  “in	  the	  name	  of”	  are	  even	  narrower	  since	  they	  
might	  require	  the	  proof	   that	   the	  person	  was	   legally	  entitled	  to	  act	   for	  or	  represent	  
the	  entity.	  In	  these	  cases,	  the	  legal	  entities	  cannot	  possibly	  be	  held	  liable	  for	  external	  
persons	  such	  as	  local	  consultants	  although	  these	  persons	  bribe	  in	  favor	  for	  (and	  with	  
knowledge	  of)	  the	  entity.	  	  
	  
b)	  According	  to	  the	  German	  law,	  a	  legal	  entity	  can	  be	  fined,	  when	  a	  mid-­‐	  or	  top-­‐level	  
(see	  infra	  c))	  manager	  has	  committed	  a	  criminal	  or	  administrative	  offence	  that	  has	  	  
• either	  enriched	  the	  entity	  (respectively	  has	  been	  committed	  in	  order	  to	  enrich	  
the	  entity),	  
• or	  has	  violated	  duties	  of	  the	  legal	  entity.	  
	  
The	  failure	  of	  supervision	  by	  the	  owner	  of	  an	  enterprise	  is	  an	  administrative	  offence,	  
if	  this	  failure	  of	  supervision	  has	  facilitated	  a	  criminal	  offence	  or	  another	  breach	  of	  du-­‐
ty	  by	  an	  employee.	  
	  
c)	  According	  to	  the	  German	  law,	  mid-­‐	  or	  top-­‐level	  persons	  are	  only	  persons,	  who	  	  
• either	  legally	  represent	  the	  entity	  as	  an	  organ,	  	  
• are	  legally	  entitled	  to	  act	  for	  the	  entity,	  	  
• or	  hold	  an	  executive	  office,	  including	  those,	  who	  have	  a	  leading	  role	  in	  super-­‐
vising	  employees.	  	  
Hence,	  the	  scope	  of	  the	  German	  law	  is	  narrower	  than	  that	  of	  other	   jurisdictions.	   In	  
the	   context	   of	   combatting	   foreign	   corruption	   the	   question	   whether	   a	   person	   in	   a	  
leading	  supervisory	  position	  knew	  of	  the	  bribes	  or	  must	  have	  had	  knowledge	  is	  cru-­‐
cial.	  Therefore,	   the	  entity	  cannot	  be	  held	   liable	   in	  cases,	   in	  which	   local	  consultants,	  
who	  must	   not	   or	   cannot	   be	   supervised	   by	   executive	   persons,	   have	   committed	   the	  
acts	  of	  bribery.	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7.	  Intermediaries	  
	  
In	   order	   to	   ensure	   that	   legal	   persons	   avoid	   liability	   by	   using	   intermediaries	   (might	  
they	  be	  consultants,	  subsidiaries	  or	  other	  entities)	  countries	  should	  first	  of	  all	  provide	  
for	  a	  sufficiently	  wide	  scope	  of	  persons,	  whose	  supervisory	  failures	  can	  trigger	  corpo-­‐
rate	   liability.	   If	   the	   law	   (such	  as	   in	  Germany,	   see	  supra	  6.)	  only	  covers	  persons	   in	  a	  
leading	   supervisory	   position,	   it	   is	   comparably	   unlikely	   that	   these	   persons	   have	  
knowledge	  or	  can	  have	  knowledge	  of	  bribes	  paid	  by	  external	  persons	  in	  foreign	  coun-­‐
tries.	  The	  knowledge,	  and	  with	  this	  the	  legal	  responsibility,	  thins	  out,	   if	  the	  number	  
of	   people	   between	   the	   intermediary	   and	   the	   leading	   supervisory	   person	   is	   high.	  
Moreover,	   states	   should	  provide	   for	   rules,	  which	  do	  not	   limit	   supervisory	  duties	   to	  
the	   internal	   sphere	   of	   the	   legal	   entity	   (normative	   approach),	   but	   rather	   opt	   for	   a	  
functional	  approach:	  according	  to	   the	   latter,	   supervisory	  duties	  emerge	  every	   time,	  
an	  entity	  uses	  an	  intermediary	  as	  a	  necessary	  tool	  to	  make	  contacts	  with	  foreign	  pub-­‐
lic	  officials	  in	  order	  to	  establish	  or	  carry	  on	  business	  transactions.	  By	  means	  of	  such	  
rules,	  the	  possibility	  of	  outsourcing	  legal	  responsibilities	  for	  (natural	  or	  legal)	  persons	  
running	  business	  for	  the	  legal	  entity	  can	  be	  minimized.	  	  
	  
8.	  Successor	  liability	  
	  
a)	  Providing	  for	  a	  liability	  of	  successors	  of	  a	  legal	  entity	  is	  important	  for	  ensuring	  that	  
legal	  persons	  can	  be	  held	  liable.	  The	  dimension	  of	  this	  issue	  is	  however	  linked	  to	  the	  
dimension	  of	  possible	  sanctions	  and	  fines.	  If	  a	  national	  legislation	  only	  enables	  minor	  
fines	   (Austria)	   or	   medium-­‐scaled	   fines	   (Germany),	   the	   incentive	   for	   enterprises	   to	  
avoid	   liability	  by	  means	  of	   restructuring	   the	  enterprise	   is	   low.	  For	   this	   reason,	  Ger-­‐
man	  cases	  in	  which	  enterprises	  have	  avoided	  fines	  by	  changing	  the	  identity	  of	  a	  legal	  
person,	   its	   ownership	   or	   even	   terminating	   the	   legal	   existence,	   can	   only	   be	   found,	  
where	  fines	  are	  significant:	  in	  competition	  law,	  that	  does	  not	  limit	  the	  fines	  to	  10	  mil-­‐
lion	  euro.	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b)	   A	   good	   approach	   to	   hamper	   the	   described	   avoidance	   strategies	   is	   providing	   for	  
sanctions	  that	  do	  not	  address	  a	  concrete	   legal	  person,	  but	  the	  economic	  enterprise	  
as	  such	  (the	  European	  competition	  law	  includes	  such	  an	  instrument).	  By	  this	  means,	  





a)	   In	   international	  business	  that	   is	  dominated	  by	  multinational	  enterprises,	  the	  Par-­‐
ties’	   lack	   of	   direct	   jurisdiction	   over	   legal	   persons	   for	   offences	   committed	   entirely	  
abroad	  represents	  a	  major	  obstacle	  to	  the	  enforcement	  of	  foreign	  bribery	  offences.	  
If,	   for	  example,	  a	  German	  enterprise	  cannot	  be	  held	   liable	   in	  Germany,	  because	  all	  
relevant	  acts	  have	  been	  committed	  abroad,	  in	  particular	  by	  means	  of	  foreign	  compa-­‐
ny	  daughters,	  the	  German	  laws	  do	  not	  apply.	  
	  
b)	  In	  order	  to	  avoid	  this,	  the	  principle	  of	  territoriality	  (cf.	  §	  5	  German	  Law	  on	  Adminis-­‐
trative	  Offences)	  should	  be	  accompanied	  by	  the	  principle	  of	  nationality.	  The	  principle	  
of	   (active)	  nationality	   is	  based	  on	  the	   idea	  that	  a	  state	  has	  sovereignty	  over	   its	  citi-­‐
zens.4	  If	  a	  state	  applies	  that	  principle	  on	  legal	  entities,	  one	  has	  to	  decide	  under	  which	  
circumstances	  a	  legal	  person	  is	  to	  be	  regarded	  as	  a	  national.	  The	  typical	  solutions	  are	  
that	  a	  company’s	  nationality	  can	  either	  be	  based	  on	  the	  location	  of	  its	  registration	  or	  
the	   location,	   in	   which	   it	   carries	   out	   its	   business	   transactions.	   The	   second	   option	  
would	  cause	  a	  multitude	  of	  overlapping	  jurisdictions,	  since	  the	  majority	  of	  major	  and	  
medium-­‐sized	  enterprises	  do	  business	  in	  more	  than	  one	  country.	  For	  that	  reason,	  the	  
first	   option	   –	   place	   of	   registration	   –	   is	   preferable.	  However,	   as	   a	  mother	   company	  
dominates	   its	   (foreign)	   daughters,	   the	   homeland	   of	   the	  mother	   company	   also	   has	  
sovereignty	  over	  the	  daughter	  companies.	  Therefore,	  a	  national	  legal	  person	  can	  be	  
held	  liable	  for	  criminal	  offences	  committed	  by	  representatives	  of	  a	  foreign	  daughter	  
                                            
4	  SCHNEIDER,	  A.	  (2014)	  Corporate	  Criminal	  Liability	  and	  Conflict	  of	  Jurisdiction	  in:	  Borodowski	  et	  al.	  (ed.)	  
Regulating	  Corporate	  Criminal	  Liability,	  p.	  249,	  251-­‐2.	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company,	  at	  least	  in	  cases,	  in	  which	  the	  mother	  company	  benefits	  significantly	  from	  
the	  relevant	  business	  transaction.	  
	  
10.	  Compliance	  systems	  as	  means	  of	  precluding	  liability	  
	  
a)	   Corporate	   liability,	   especially	   a	   liability	   under	   the	   FCPA,	   had	   a	  major	   impact	   on	  
sharpening	   compliance	  management	   systems	   in	  big	  and	  medium-­‐sized	  German	  en-­‐
terprises.	  Already	  in	  2011,	  59%	  of	  all	  German	  enterprises	  had	  implemented	  compli-­‐
ance	  programmes;5	   some	  of	   them	  have	  even	   set	   international	   standards.6	   In	  2013,	  
74%	   of	   all	   enterprises	   had	   implemented	   compliance	   programmes.7	   It	   is	   likely,	   that	  
the	   percentage	   has	   even	   increased	   during	   the	   last	   three	   years.	   Against	   that	   back-­‐
ground,	  one	  could	  argue	  that	  introducing	  corporate	  criminal	  liability	  is	  not	  necessary	  
to	   trigger	   the	   implementation	   of	   compliance	   programmes	   in	   German	   enterprises.8	  
However,	  several	  scandals	  in	  enterprises,	  which	  already	  had	  implemented	  a	  compli-­‐
ance	  management	  system,	  show	  that	  the	  sheer	  act	  of	  implementation	  does	  not	  pre-­‐
vent	  corruption:	  compliance	  programmes	  must	  be	  adaptive	  and	  come	  to	  the	  core	  of	  
the	   corporate	   culture.	   In	   my	   view,	   a	   modern	   code	   on	   corporate	   criminal	   liability,	  
providing	  for	  prosecution	  agreements,	  can	  be	  an	  effective	  tool	  to	  change	  the	  corpo-­‐
rate	  culture	  for	  the	  better.	  
	  
b)	   In	   Germany,	   several	   lobby	   groups	   and	   professional	   associations	   have	   presented	  
proposals	  for	  laws	  that	  explicitly	  acknowledge	  compliance	  as	  a	  reason	  for	  waiving	  li-­‐
ability	  or	  mitigating	  the	  sanction.9	  However,	  a	  general	   incentive	  to	   implement	  com-­‐
pliance	  system	  exists,	  if	  the	  latter	  influences	  liability	  and	  its	  dimension,	  as	  enterprises	  
and	  its	  organs	  have	  a	  rational	  interest	  in	  avoiding	  (personal)	  liability.	  This	  effect	  exists	  
                                            
5	  BUSSMANN,	  K./NESTLER,	  Cl./SALVENMOSER,	  S.	  (2011)	  Wirtschaftskriminalität	  Frankfurt	  a.M./Halle,	  p.	  
34.	  
6	  BUSSMANN/NESTLER/SALVENMOSER,	  supra	  note	  4,	  p.	  60.	  
7	   BUSSMANN,	   K./NESTLER,	   Cl./SALVENMOSER,	   S.	   (2013)	   Wirtschaftskriminalität	   und	  
Unternehmenskultur	  2013	  	  Frankfurt	  a.M./Halle	  p.	  26.	  
8	   For	   a	   discussion	   of	   that	   argument	   see	   KUBICIEL,	  M	   (2014)	  Verbandsstrafe	   -­‐	   Verfassungskonformität	  
und	  Systemkompatibilität	  in:	  47	  Zeitschrift	  für	  Rechtspolitik,	  p.	  133,	  135-­‐136.	  
9	  See	  KUBICIEL,	  M.	  (2016)	  Compliance	  als	  Strafausschlussgrund	  in	  einem	  künftigen	  Unternehmensstraf-­‐
recht	  in:	  Ahlbrecht	  et	  al.	  (ed.)	  Unternehmensstrafrecht.	  Festschrift	  für	  Jürgen	  Wessing,	  p.	  69-­‐79.	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irrespective	  of	  the	  form	  of	  acknowledgement	  by	  law.	  In	  my	  view,	  it	  is	  thus	  not	  neces-­‐
sary	  for	  the	  law	  to	  explicitly	  provide	  for	  that.	  In	  any	  case,	  a	  legislator	  should	  abstain	  
from	   the	   attempt	   to	   specify	   the	   conditions,	   under	   which	   the	  mere	   existence	   of	   a	  
compliance	   program	   could	   affect	   the	   sanction,	   for	   this	  might	   lead	   to	   rather	   static,	  
non-­‐adaptive	  programs,	  that	  simply	  try	  to	  match	  the	  standards	  mentioned	  in	  the	  law.	  	  
	  
c)	  In	  general,	  the	  prosecution	  office	  has	  to	  carry	  the	  burden	  of	  proof.	  However,	  in	  en-­‐
terprises,	   in	  which	   several	   corruption	   cases	   or	   a	   case	   of	   a	   huge	   dimension	   has	   oc-­‐
curred,	  the	  burden	  of	  proof	  de	  facto	  is	  being	  shifted	  to	  the	  enterprise.	  In	  such	  cases,	  
it	  simply	  arguing	  that	  the	  compliance	  system	  has	  worked	  well	  simply	  does	  not	  seem	  
plausible	  to	  prosecutors.	  According	  to	  my	  experience,	   that	   is	  how	  law	  enforcement	  
bodies	  in	  Germany	  assess	  the	  quality	  of	  a	  compliance	  system.	  
	  
11.	  Sanctions	  and	  mitigating	  factors	  
	  
The	  most	  efficient	  sanction,	  beside	  fines,	   is	  the	   legal	  obligation	  to	  alter	  the	   internal	  
control	  and	  compliance	  systems	  under	  the	  supervision	  of	  a	  monitor.	  Both	  sanctions,	  
especially	   when	   combined,	   allow	   for	   a	   fair	   retribution	   and	   effective	   prevention	   of	  
corruption.	  In	  contrast	  to	  that,	  the	  least	  effective	  sanctions,	  in	  my	  view,	  are	  the	  sus-­‐
pension	  from	  public	  tenders	  or	  state	  subsidies,	  since	  these	  sanctions	  do	  not	  enhance	  
internal	  reforms,	  but	  could	  even	  hamper	  the	  process	  of	  internal	  renewal.	  	  	  
	  
All	  aspects	  –	  implementation	  of	  a	  compliance	  system,	  voluntary	  disclosure,	  coopera-­‐
tion	  –	  should	  mitigate	  the	  sanction,	  since	  these	  aspects	  are	  indicators	  for	  a	  process	  of	  
internal	  renewal,	  that	  prevents	  future	  acts	  of	  corruption.	  Moreover,	  all	  aspects	  men-­‐
tioned	  could	  also	  mitigate	  a	  sanction	  imposed	  on	  a	  natural	  person;	  there	  are	  no	  rea-­‐
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12.	  Settlements	  
	  
a)	   The	  German	   law	  does	   not	   allow	  proper	   settlements,	   however,	   they	   are	   not	   un-­‐
known	  in	  Germany	  due	  to	  settlements	  between	  German	  enterprises	  and	  US	  authori-­‐
ties.	   Moreover,	   the	   German	   law	   enables	   the	   cessation	   of	   criminal	   proceedings	  
against	   individuals	   under	   obligations,	  which	   is	   an	   instrument	   comparable	  with	   set-­‐
tlements.	   The	   advantages	   of	   instruments	   like	   settlements	   are	   their	   flexibility	   and	  
their	  potential	  to	  improve	  compliance	  systems	  and	  the	  corporate	  culture.	  	  
	  
b)	  A	  conviction	  as	  a	  fundamental	  requirement	  for	  sanctioning	  a	  (natural	  or	  legal)	  per-­‐
son:	  neither	  a	  conviction	  nor	   the	  act	  of	   sanctioning	   is	  an	  end	   in	   itself.	  Rather,	   they	  
must	  be	  justified	  by	  retributive	  and	  preventive	  goals.	  A	  conviction	  is	  necessary	  for	  a	  
sanction	  as	  a	  mean	  of	  retribution:	  only	  when	  it	  is	  clear	  that	  a	  (natural	  or	  legal)	  person	  
has	  actually	  committed	  an	  offence,	  a	  proper	  sanction	  may	  be	  imposed.	  If	  a	  legal	  con-­‐
sequence	  to	  a	  suspicion	  however	  aims	  at	  preventing	  possible	  future	  crime,	  a	  convic-­‐
tion	  is	  not	  necessary.	  Instead,	  the	  fact-­‐based	  assumption,	  that	  the	  corporate	  compli-­‐
ance	  did	  not	  work	  well,	  may	  be	  regarded	  as	  a	  sufficient	  trigger	  for	  imposing	  preven-­‐
tive	  sanctions,	  such	  as	  the	  condition	  to	   improve	  compliance	  programs.	  Therefore,	  a	  
settlement	  without	  conviction	  can	  be	  both	  legitimate	  and	  rational.	  
	  
c)	   I	  would	   question	  whether	   it	  makes	   sense	   to	   differentiate	   between	   a	   settlement	  
and	  a	   sanction,	   since	  any	   settlement	  will	   include	   several	   conditions,	   the	  enterprise	  
has	  to	  comply	  with.	  As	  the	  implementation	  of	  these	  conditions	  usually	  is	  expensive,	  
these	   settlements	   have	   a	   deterrent	   effect.	  Moreover,	   a	   settlement	   comprising	   the	  
implementation	  of	  a	  new	  compliance	  programs	  to	  be	  monitored	  by	  law	  enforcement	  
bodies	  or	  a	  official	  representative	  provide	  for	  future	  corporate	  compliance	  in	  a	  better	  
way	  than	  fining	  companies.	  
